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Responsibility: A Psychologist's
Point of View
By RICHARD L. BLANTON*
Knowledge, Choice and Action
The word "responsibility" refers to the ability to accept the
consequences of a choice, and a person is said to be "responsible"
if he can be shown to have such an ability as a result of capacity
and/or experience.
A person, in order to survive, must choose between alternatives
for acting. Under certain circumstances he is required to accept
the consequences of his choice and is held accountable to society
for errors. Under other circumstances he is accountable only to
himself. Society decides, on the basis of its own experience, for
which choices its members must be held accountable. The subject
matter of Law consists of descriptions of these choice situations as
well as the prescribed alternatives which are io be punished or
rewarded.
For many centuries, society has accepted and held to be valid
assumption that a human act is either "free" or "compelled". The
argument raised by Professor De Boer has been the subject of much
discussion in the Law, Theology, the Humanities, the Social Sci-
ences and Philosophy. It is asserted that if an act is determined by
natural law, choice cannot exist; hence the person is not free but
is compelled to act as he does and cannot be held responsible.
Society's representatives in the law have sought for "tests" by
which a person may be shown to have acted under "natural law",
i.e. compulsion on the one hand or "free will" on the other. Such
a search is not only fruitless, it is based on a misunderstanding of
human freedom and natural law.
An act is a result of the capacity, knowledge and motivation
of the acting person. Given no changes in these, an act could not
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have been different than it was. Freedom exists to the degree that
a person is permitted to act in pursuit of his own values. He is
held responsible for the effects that such acts may have on his
society. That his actions are caused by factors of which he may be
ignorant does not exempt him from punishment, for the purpose
of punishment is to motivate him to learn. To the notion that
causality implies compulsion it can be replied that science does
not define cause in this sense. Causality refers to the regularity of
observed events. The key word here is "observed". Causation is
a matter of knowledge, not a matter of force. The idea that cause
consists of the application of force is probably derived from our
own experience of the mechanical aspects of our own body move-
ments and has been supported by the eighteenth-century convic-
tion that all natural phenomena can be reduced to the principles
of classical mechanics. This belief is at variance with the principles
of modern science.
On the other hand, the experience of choice is probably due to
the inability of a person at the moment of action to know all the
processes which lead to the act itself. The complex of values,
needs and motives is projected against a world of external fact,
and an act is a result of inadequate knowledge of ourselves as well
as incomplete knowledge of the world. Where no knowledge
exists, that is, where the alternatives appear equivalent because of
lack of knowledge of the state of the world and the self, a response
is made at random. We say that we "take a chance". In a sense,
we can call this a completely free choice, but such a use of the
term is paradoxical since the choice is not made in the usual sort
of effort to bring about a correspondence between the external
events and our own values and needs. The consequences of a
random choice are "accidental" and the person is usually not held
responsible for choices of this sort if he can be shown to have an
acceptable motive for having made it.
In any case, freedom depends upon the ability to choose and
hence cannot depend upon ignorance or chance. It must, there-
fore, depend upon knowledge. A man who must act without
knowledge cannot predict or control the consequences of his
actions and is, in this sense, a slave. It is for this reason that
education is perhaps the most vital function in a democratic
society.
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Now there are two types of situations in which persons accept
the consequences of acting without knowledge. The first of these
includes a large number of the behaviors called "games". In gam-
bling it is the rule that everyone must be ignorant to some speci-
fied degree. He may, for example, know anything except the order
of the cards in the deck. In this case, possession of information is
unethical. It is ruled that he must make a choice based on ignor-
ance and assume the responsibility for it which is stipulated by the
rules of the game. Games are interesting psychological phe-
nomena, though not of primary concern to us here. It may be
said, however, that many offenders against society, particularly
juveniles, appear not to distinguish well between "real" and
"game" situations. It is felt that one who is "playing" should not
be punished for error.
The second situation in which persons accept the consequences
of acting without knowledge is called a learning situation. Here,
one acts in a state of ignorance in order to obtain information on
which to base future choices. Responsibility for error is then ac-
cepted only as the price of knowledge, and society makes special
exemptions on the basis of agreed upon rules in such cases. "Give
the fellow a chance," we say, "he's got to learn." While it is com-
monly said that "Ignorance is no excuse," what we actually mean
is that a person is held accountable first for failure to learn the pat-
terns of behavior acceptable to society. This is his primary re-
sponsibility.
If, then, the ability to choose depends upon knowledge, re-
sponsibility also depends upon knowledge. The question of what
knowledge depends upon is a psychological question and can be
answered scientifically, although the detailed answer to this ques-
tion will require many more years of study. Put very simply,
knowledge depends upon the capacity to learn, the opportunity to
learn, and the need to learn. All of these are interrelated in com-
plex ways not now well understood. But let us examine them
briefly and attempt to make a general statement of our problem
in the light of this examination.
Society cannot provide the capacity to learn, it can only at-
tempt to remedy or compensate for organic defects. For such con-
ditions as deafness, blindness and epilepsy, the situation is very
hopeful. For mental deficiency, we can do little except determine
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the nature and extent of the deficit and plan for such compensa-
tions as appear feasible at present. The problem of insanity is an
especially difficult one and there are many thorny issues. If mental
illness is a kind of deficiency, i.e. an organic illness, we would be
faced with the task of helping the patient to compensate for a lack
of a capacity we cannot as yet identify. Many mental illnesses,
however, are almost certainly due to distortion in the areas of need
and opportunity to learn, and the prevention and cure of such
mental illnesses must await further knowledge of these factors if
it is to be effective.
The opportunity to learn, on the other hand, is a matter for
which society has assumed primary responsibility. Its own con-
tinuation depends upon provision of such opportunity to all its
members. Much of the responsibility is assigned to the family,
since experience has shown that critical aspects of need-formation
and information are best provided in the home. Other institutions
have been established to supplement the work of the family. We
know, however, that unless a person is permitted to meet situations
leading to reward and punishment he cannot acquire the need and
the knowledge to choose appropriately. When mental illness or
delinquency result from poverty of experience they are oppor-
tunity problems. It is because of poverty of experience that we
exempt children from responsibility for antisocial acts.
The need to learn is a condition of life itself and arises from
the fundamental instability of living substances. Society requires
that people learn to get along with each other, since otherwise it
cannot survive. Since rewards and punishments follow social acts,
getting along with others soon appears as a separate need which is
founded on the basic physical needs but which soon becomes even
stronger than some of the physical needs in the determination of
everyday behavior. Systems of "manners", for example, lend con-
sistency and predictibility to social behavior and a measure of
security to social interaction. Society can provide the need to
learn the special skills and knowledge on which socially meaning-
ful choices depend. It does this by rewarding and punishing the
acts of its members. Social responsibility is therefore an outgrowth
of appropriate reward and punishment.
Unfortunately, people have usually assumed that needs or
motives are sui generis, that they arise outside the context of social
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learning. It is said that we cannot take the responsibility for insur-
ing that a person will love good and reject evil. This belief is not
only demonstrably false, but in fact society has always placed the
responsibility for such teaching on the family. Our problem is to
discover in what respects the family may fail in this teaching and
supplement it with other institutional facilities.
Learning, Reward, and Punishment
From the psychologist's point of view, the question is not
"What is the person's responsibility for his acts?" He is always
completely responsible to the extent that his behavior leads to
socially relevant consequences. This does not mean, however, that
society can make a priori decisions about the punishments or re-
wards which should follow any particular act. Society, too, makes
a choice and hence has the responsibility to determine for each
case what punishments or rewards will lead to acceptable behavior
in the future. For many centuries social law has sought to achieve
the inevitability of natural law. The greater its similarity to an
implacable "Fate", the greater its power is thought to be. Yet we
are all aware that punishment for punishment's sake is not only
useless but harmful. If a punishment results in no change of be-
havior, then society is paying too high a price for useless educa-
tional methods. The pleasure of vengeance and the satisfaction of
playing the role of "Fate" are not worth the cost.
In recent years, society and its legal agents have taken a dif-
ferent approach to the problem of mental illness. We have, in-
deed, gone so far in the opposite direction as to fail often to ad-
minister appropriate patterns of reward and punishment for ac-
complishing behavioral changes in such persons. In dealing with
crime, however, we remain on the defensive. We reject vengeance
as unchristian and lustful, as an act of weakness rather than
strength. And we argue that punishment is a deterrent to crime,
saying that crime can be prevented only if society interposes ex-
ternal obstacles in the path of the delinquent person. At the same
time, we all know that behavior is finally determined by processes
within the individual and that external forces can change behavior
only if corresponding changes take place within the individual
himself. We make the law an object of fear, and this probably
results in greater conformity in some instances. But the purpose
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is distorted by the misuse of the means. As Tagore says, "The
clumsiness of power spoils the key and uses the pick-axe."
In short, unless a person lacks the capacity to learn, the prob-
lem of responsibility in mental disease cannot be separated from
the problem of responsibility in general. Where mental illness
is a result of failure to learn, our responsibility is to teach and to
use any rewards and punishments necessary to accomplish that
objective which our values stipulate. It has long been known
that many mental patients acquire the motivation to recover from
being deprived of their freedom and confined to a hospital. Is
this, in every case, the most effective punishment? What others
should we employ? Patients also improve as a result of the interest
and concern shown by others for their welfare. Is this the most
effective reward? What others should we employ? And what,
given the utility of a reward or punishment, is the best means for
administering it? We need research on these problems. We need
to study the rewarding and punishing aspects of the hospital en-
vironment and their relationships to improvement of patient be-
havior. We need more fundamental information about the proc-
esses by which motives and habits are acquired and changed in
real-life situations.
Mental patients and their relatives are usually gratified when
the patient is labelled "sick" since this absolves them of guilt.
This attitude does much harm to treatment programs, since by
implication the person is also absolved of responsibility for further
learning. Medical science has learned that even in physical illness,
much of the responsibility for recovery must remain with the
patient if he is to be restored to fully adequate functioning. The
mental patient must accept the responsibility to learn as the price
of healthy living.
Similarly, the criminal or delinquent person must accept the
responsibility to learn as the price of social acceptance, and any
rewards and punishments necessary to accomplish his habilitation
should be sought out and employed. If, in a given case, imprison-
ment is likely to be effective, by all means let us imprison him. If
love and care are likely to be most effective, let us use them. But
let us never forget that a means and a purpose should be related
by fact and not by feeling alone.
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Insanity and crime are, as Maudsley has said, "Neither acci-
dents nor anomalies in the universe, but come by law and testify
to causality." If this is true, and if it is true that the principal pur-
pose of society is to achieve maximum realization of the values it
chooses to hold, then the problem of responsibility as historically
posed is a pseudo-problem. The question is not whether a person
should be exempted from punishment. The question is rather,
"By what means can we teach him what he needs to know in order
to behave acceptably?"
In summary, it seems to me that responsibility depends upon
the ability to choose appropriately which in turn depends upon
knowledge. Knowledge depends upon the need, the capacity and
the opportunity to learn. Society, acting through the family and
other institutions, has assumed the responsibility for providing
these or correcting flaws in them. Our greatest need is for knowl-
edge as to how to make this process more effective. The assertion
that a person's acts are determined by his past or by his physical
make-up is probably true. But this does not mean that he should
not be punished for error. Such a person should be punished or
rewarded to that extent and by those means which are necessary
and sufficient to bring about acceptable and observable changes in
his behavior through learning.
The law is conservative and not prone to experiment. This is
wise, for the knowledge of the past is usually.better than no knowl-
edge at all. But governments should support the search for knowl-
edge which will make their operations more effective, for a demo-
cratic society must be oriented to the future as well as to the past.
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